Венский Дексипп

divus

Пропретор
В 2010 г. обнаружили палимпсест с анонимной историей III в. н.э. По всей видимости, это Дексипп. Публикация фрагментов продолжается по настоящее время, Бруно Блэкманн позже издаст полный текст в своей серии Малых и фрагментарных позднеантичных историков. По ссылке список статей с публикациями отдельных страниц палимпсеста, фотографиями, немецкими переводами и комментариями.

Ссылки на статьи

Помимо прочего, на том же палимпсесте обнаружили значительные фрагменты 1-й книги Хроники Евсевия, ранее известной только в армянском переводе. Пока они не опубликованы.
 

andy4675

Цензор
Супер. А существуют предварительные публикации переводов Дексиппа (или Евсевия) данного палимпсеста, с возможностью ознакомления на каком-нибудь английском?
 

divus

Пропретор
В JRS за 2015 г. смотрите; возможно, на либгене выложат, у них оперативно получается.
Евсевия пока вообще не опубликовали, обещают в 2016 г.
 

divus

Пропретор
Английский перевод первых двух страниц:

[The Goths invaded Thra]ce and Macedonia, and plundered the entire countryside therein. And then, making an assault upon the city of the Thessalonians, they tried to capture it as a close-packed band. But since those on the walls defended themselves valiantly, warding off the battle columns with the assistance of many hands, and as none of the Scythians’ hopes came to pass, they abandoned the siege. The prevailing opinion of the host was to make for Athens and Achaia, envisioning the gold and silver votive offerings and the many processional goods in the Greek sanctuaries: for they learned that the region was exceedingly wealthy in this respect. When the approach of the Scythians was reported to the Greeks, they gathered at Thermopylae, and set about blocking them from the narrow passes there. Some carried small spears, other axes, others wooden pikes overlaid with bronze and with iron tips, or whatever each man could arm himself with. And when they came together, they completely fortified the perimeter wall and devoted themselves to its protection with haste. And it seemed that the area was otherwise very secure, since the road which led to Greece beyond the Gates was narrow and impracticable on account of the harsh terrain. For the Euboean Sea, at its greatest extent, stretches up to the flat lands near the mountains and makes them most difficult to access on account of the mud, and adjacent to these extends Mt Oeta [, which...] on account of the closeness of the rocks, makes the place almost impassable for both infantry and cavalry. The generals elected for the entire war were proclaimed by the Greeks: first Marianus, who had been chosen previously by the emperor to govern Greece inside the Gates; in addition to him, Philostratus the Athenian, a man mighty in speech and thought; and also Dexippus, who was holding the chief office among the Boeotians for the fifth time. It seemed that the most prudent course was to encourage the men with a speech, and to recall the memory of their ancestors’ valour, so that they would undertake the entire war with greater heart and not give up either during an extended period of watch, or during an attempt on the wall, if such an attempt were to take place at some point in time. When the men had gathered together, Marianus, who had been given the responsibility of addressing them on account of his status, spoke as follows: ‘O Greeks, the occasion of our preservation for which you are assembled and the land in which you have been deployed are both truly fitting to evoke the memory of virtuous deeds. For your ancestors, fighting in this place in former times, did not let Greece down and deprive it of its free state, for they fought bravely in the Persian wars and in the conflict called the Lamian war, and when they put to flight Antiochos, the despot from Asia, at which time they were already working in partnership with the Romans who were then in command. So perhaps it may be good fortune, in accordance with the daimonion, that it has been allotted to the Greeks to do battle against the barbarians in this region (indeed your own principles of fighting the wars have turned out to be valid in the past). But you may take confidence in both your preparation for these events and the strength of the region — as a result of which, in previous attacks you seemed terrifying to the enemies. On account of these things future events do not appear to me not without hope, as to better…

http://www.thehistoryblog.com/archives/date/2016/03/28
 

divus

Пропретор
Сразу обращает на себя внимание имя Филострата, ανηρ λογους και γνωμην κρατιστ(ος). С высокой вероятностью, он и Филострат Афинский, историю которого цитируют Малала и Синкелл, - одно лицо.

Ещё заметил, что Дексипп в сохранившихся фрагментах "Хроники" не использовал речи, а среди фрагментов "Скифики" речей очень много. Скорее всего, мы имеем дело либо со "Скификой", либо с её отредактированной версией (возможно, историком Евсевием).
 

divus

Пропретор
Folio 194r (lower text) lines 29–30 to 194v line 30:
Decius was concerned about the wrongdoing of the auxiliary troops and the capture of Philippopolis. And when the army was gathered, about 80,000 men, he wanted to renew the war if he could—as he thought that the situation was favorable to him, even though he had lost the auxiliary force—but also to liberate the Thracian captives and to prevent them from crossing to the other side. And for the moment, having built a trench at Hamisos [?], a place of Beroina [?], he stayed inside the encampment together with his army, watching for when the enemy were to cross. When the advance of Ostrogotha’s force was reported to him, he thought that he should encourage his soldiers, as a good opportunity arose. And he made an assembly, and when they had gathered, he spoke as follows: “Men, I wish the military force and all the provincial territory were in a good condition and not humiliated by the enemy. But since the incidents of human life bring manifold sufferings (for such is the fate of mortals), it is the duty of prudent men to accept what happens and not to lose their spirit, nor become weak, distressed by the mishap in that plain or by the capture of the Thracians—in case any of you has been disheartened by these things. For each of these two misfortunes offers arguments against your discouragement: the former was brought about by the treachery of the scouts rather than by any deficiency of ours, and the Thracian town they [sc. the Scythians] took by ambushes rather than through prowess, having failed in their attacks. And weak …{and not}24 brave …||[…” In the left (outer) margin: [De]cius’ address (demegoria)

Folio 195r (lower text) lines 1–30:
…]|| (they) formed the rear-guard, claiming to be particularly valiant and having a reputation of being the fiercest. They pretended to withdraw but stayed in the area. Not shrinking from abiding there, they built a camp as secretly as they could and lodged not far from the enemies, so that the attack could be prepared within a short time. They did, however, refrain from lighting fires at night, fearing that they might be seen. When they believed that the Thracians had become firmly convinced of their withdrawal—so much so that a rebellion against those in power had arisen (as tends to happen where there is a mass of people) and caused carelessness with the guard duty, and some had given themselves to merriment, as if the war had ended and they had achieved a splendid victory—at that point they decided to attack the town. For an advantage gained by betrayal had also encouraged them: a man had stolen away from the town and provided Cniva with information about the city (as was said, either out of hatred against one of those in power or in the hope of a big reward). And he convinced the Scythians to hold on even more firmly to their plan of attacking by promising them to give those who would be dispatched the signal in accordance with what had been agreed in the place where the fortifications could be climbed most easily. Five men, who had volunteered out of zeal and in hope of money, were sent out by Cniva by night as scouts to check what had been reported and to test the arranged betrayal. Prizes were set by the king: 500 darics for the first to climb the walls, for the sec||[ond …

Английский перевод оставшихся листов
 

divus

Пропретор
Листы спутаны настолько, что текст на страницах 192v-193r относится к 267 г. и обороне Греции от Герулов, лист 194v к войне против Остроготы (248-249 гг.), лист 195r к войне с Книвой (250-251 гг.).

Это ещё не конец работы и даже не финальный вариант реконструкции. Продолжать дешифровку и опубликовать финальный результат планируется до 2018 г. включительно.
 

andy4675

Цензор
Супер. Теперь может появиться возможность детальнее прояснить события Готской войны середины и второй половины третьего века. Хотя я не вполне понял, на основании чего первый фрагмент (про Фермопилы) датируется конкретно 267 годом. Тем не менее впечатляет, что имя Остроготы (упоминаемого Иорданом) на самом деле было реальным именем (или прозвищем?), упоминавшимся современником событий (Дексиппом?). Может быть, название остроготов и действительно не связано с понятием ост-, то есть восточных, готов? И везиготы это тоже не просто вест- (то есть "западные") готы? Очень, очень интересный и неизвестный поныне первоисточник.
 

divus

Пропретор
Ещё пара листов

Folio 195r
…guarded the rear, laying claim to valor, and having the reputation of being very brave. Having pretended to retreat, they [the Scythians, i.e.] remained there, not shirking the delay, but having pitched camp as inconspicuously as possible, and bivouacked not far from the enemy, so that the stratagem could be got ready at short notice; and they refrained from lighting fires by night, out of fear that they might be visible. But when they thought that the Thracians had become firmly convinced of their retreat (and a certain amount of seditious feeling towards the leading citizens, as tends to happen in a crowd, had caused the watch to be neglected, and some of them were busy enjoying themselves, supposing that they had brought the war to an end and <won a> very brilliant victory), they [the Scythians] decided to storm the city. And in addition [i.e. to their being unobserved by those inside the city] a factor conducive to treachery led them on. And someone escaping from the lower city, so it was said [later, i.e.], either out of enmity towards one of the magistrates, or in hope of a large reward as well - this man reported the situation in the city to Cniva, and made the Scythians all the more inclined to undertake the attack, promising that he would raise a <fire-> signal at the part of the fortification where it was most accessible, in accordance with what had been (?) agreed with the men sent out. (And Cniva had (?) sent out by night five men, volunteers by reason of their own eagerness and also from hope of money, to reconnoiter what had been reported and to verify the talk of treachery.) As prizes the king offered five hundred darics to the first man to climb the walls, and to the second…

Folio 194r
… message, and being dismayed by the present circumstance, they also became fearful for …. themselves (?); so it seemed best under the present circumstances to take precautions for their own protection, each as they had strength in their own forces and their allied contingent (?). And Ptolemaios the Athenian, who was commanding the Thessalians after being sent by the emperor, held the border country between Macedonia and Thessaly with a guard (this is divided by its nature, <which is> narrow and difficult to cross), while the Athenians and Boeotians advanced to Pylae [Thermopylae], since they thought this an excellent place to block the advance, and that it would not be an easy thing for the barbarians to advance into Greece below Pylae. This then was their situation. But when Ostrogouthos, the leader of the Scythians, heard that Philippopolis had been taken, and that the Scythians were holding Cniva in the highest regard, and were celebrating him in song, as is their ancestral custom when they have especially good fortune and success in war, whereas they were holding himself in less esteem, accusing him of cowardice and failure in his tactics, he thought it unbearable not to make amends to the Scythian cause by some notable achievement; <so> setting out, he marched quickly with an army of some fifty thousand. But Decius was grieved by <his> failure to bring help and by the capture of Philippopolis...

Дексипп: новые фрагменты

Осталось ещё порядка 3-х страниц, т.е. 3-х фрагментов.

По датировке, комментариям пока рано что-то говорить, нужно дождаться окончания публикации.
 

divus

Пропретор
195r - повтор, но в новой интерпретации. В любом случае, рекомендую скачать статью. Наверное, это самый последний на сегодняшний день update по Дексиппу.
 

divus

Пропретор
Авторами текста могут быть Дексипп, Филострат или Евсевий (если последнего можно считать самостоятельным автором). Филострат слишком уж себе льстит в фрагменте о Фермопилах, хотя есть некоторый шанс, что льстит он своему одноименному родственнику. Информация о Филострате базируется на сирийской историографии - Иоанн Малала и сирийские переводы Георгия Синкелла. О нем молчит даже Евнапий, хотя, он мог не считать мемуарные труды "историей".
 

divus

Пропретор
Супер. Теперь может появиться возможность детальнее прояснить события Готской войны середины и второй половины третьего века. Хотя я не вполне понял, на основании чего первый фрагмент (про Фермопилы) датируется конкретно 267 годом. Тем не менее впечатляет, что имя Остроготы (упоминаемого Иорданом) на самом деле было реальным именем (или прозвищем?), упоминавшимся современником событий (Дексиппом?). Может быть, название остроготов и действительно не связано с понятием ост-, то есть восточных, готов? И везиготы это тоже не просто вест- (то есть "западные") готы? Очень, очень интересный и неизвестный поныне первоисточник.

Как Ногайская орда в честь Ногая. Хотя, по-моему, там не все однозначно.
 

Ruslan Agdeev

Плебейский трибун
Известно ли, как обстоят дела с публикацией манускрипта на данном этапе?
Есть ли новости?
 

Ruslan Agdeev

Плебейский трибун
Статья Олега Вуса "Гибель Дециев. Разгром римской армии у Абритуса как кульминация Скифской войны 250—251 гг.", написанная с учетом опубликованных фрагментов.
Дата публикации: декабрь 2018 года.

Прямая ссылка на pdf-файл.
 
Верх